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The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in
Retrospect
Bernhard G. Bechhoefer
(AVER TEN YEARS AGO, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States signed a treaty banning nuclear
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.'
The road to this agreement was long and difficult. Discussions of
arms control and disarmament
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no matter how hopeless the outlook; that any progress towards arms
control will depend upon agreement among the nuclear powers and
in particular between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.3 Nevertheless,
until August 1963, these negotiations had not produced a single
substantive agreement limiting or controlling the buildup of arma-
ments. President Kennedy described the Limited Test Ban Treaty
as "the first concrete result of eighteen years of effort by the United
States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race."4
1 UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 1945-1965, at
176 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT).
2Id. at 1.
3 B. G. BECHHOEFFER, POST-WAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL 567-569
(1961).
4 Hearings on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Before the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations of the Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. on Exec. M., at 2-4 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings).
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From 1958 to 1963, the most serious, indeed the only serious,
negotiations on arms control took place in the Eighteen Nations
Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) and some of its subcommit-
tees on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests. Despite
strong pressures from the United Nations and the non-nuclear weap-
ons states directed to the nuclear powers to reach some agreement,
as late as June 1963, the negotiations had reached an apparent im-
passe primarily because of the inability of the U.S. and Soviet Union
to reach agreement on the amount and character of on-site inspec-
tions which would be required in the territories of the nuclear pow-
ers to assure against clandestine testing of nuclear weapons.'
In April 1963, the Soviet Union gave some hints of a desire to
improve the political atmosphere and in particular agreed to negoti-
ate on a U.S. proposal to establish what later was described as a
"hot line" of direct communication between the U.S. and Soviet
governments. On June 10, President Kennedy delivered the Com-
mencement address at American University, in Washington, D.C.,
entitled "Towards a Strategy of Peace" calling for increased under-
standing with the U.S.S.R.7 He announced that he, United King-
dom Prime Minister Macmillan, and Chairman Krushchev had
agreed that high level discussions would begin shortly in Moscow
on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. On June 14, Chairman
Krushchev reiterated his determination not to permit on-site inspec-
tions as a part of a nuclear test ban treaty but stated that President
Kennedy's American University address was "the greatest speech
by any American President since Roosevelt."'
On July 2, 1963, Premier Khrushchev said that the U.S. and
U.K. insistence on on-site inspections made an underground ban
impossible. Therefore the Soviet Union was prepared to sign a
limited treaty banning tests in three non-controversial environments
- in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
On August 27, 1962, the U.S. and U.K. had submitted to the
Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament a proposed treaty ban-
ning nuclear testing in these three areas, where on-site inspection
5 For a brief description of the Eighteenth Nation Committee on Disarmament, see
THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
GSee THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at Chap. 8 & 9.
7 For the text of the President's speech, see N. Y. Times, June 11, 1963, at 16.
8 H. JACOBSON AND E. STEIN, DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS AND POLITICIANS 447-
453 (1966) [hereinafter cited as JACOBSON AND STEIN].
9 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 175-76. JACOBSON
AND STEIN, supra note 6, at 454.
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would not be required to determine whether or not the treaty was
being observed.'" President Eisenhower had made such a sugges-
tion to Chairman Krushchev in 1959, and President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Macmillan had formally offered such a treaty in Sep-
tember, 1961." The Soviet Union had invariably rejected such an
approach.
After Krushchev's speech, progress was rapid, resulting in an
agreed text in thirty-four days. The debates in the United Nations,
in the U.S. Congress and in the forum of world opinion leading to
its approval in the U.N. and ratification stressed three areas of dis-
cussion: the immediate achievements of the treaty; its limitations in
contrast to the hopes and desires set forth in numerous past U.N.
resolutions; and the necessity of progress building on the treaty ac-
cords toward further limitation of nuclear armaments and a safer
world.
Within these areas of discussion, a dozen or so specific problems
have developed, some, but not all of which involved interesting
questions which can be characterized as predominantly ]-gal. It
would not be fruitful to confine this article to a paragrapil by para-
graph analysis of the strictly legal issues, since the legal problems
are fully understandable only in the context of surrounding politi-
cal and strategic factors. Therefore, primarily to maintain a proper
perspective, this article seeks to sketch the major problem areas with
emphasis on those where interesting legal problems have arisen.
The text of the Treaty is sufficiently short to justify its reproduc-
tion in full as a part of the article.
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE,
IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER
The Governments of the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Orig-
inal Parties,"
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achieve-
ment of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under
strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the
United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race
and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all
kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
10 (Letter of the Acting Secretary of State to the President recommending ratification
of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, August 6, 1963) Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearings, supra note 4, at 4.
11 JACOBSON AND STEIN, supra note 6, at 171 and 282-83.
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nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to
this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's
environment by radioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit,
to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion,
or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction
or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space;
or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radio-
active debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.
It is understood in this connection that the provisions of the sub-
paragraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty re-
sulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions,
including all such explosions underground, the conclusions of
which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty,
they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore
to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating
in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any
of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in
paragraph 1 of this Article.
ARTICLE II
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The
text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the De-
positary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this
Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of
the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a confer-
ence, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such
amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a ma-
jority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the
votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter
into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of rati-
fication by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments
of ratification of all of the Original Parties.
ARTICLE III
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any
State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at
any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory
States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties -
[Vol. 5: 125
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the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all
the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratifica-
tion.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all sig-
natory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date
of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this
Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of
any requests for conferences or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Govern-
ments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in ad-
vance.
ARTICLE V
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be trans-
mitted by the Depositary Governments to the Goxernments of the
signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have
signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of Au-
gust, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three" 12
In broad outline the years of negotiations showed three main
objectives of a Treaty completely banning nuclear weapons tests -
objectives which were only partially fulfilled by the Limited Test
Ban. The individual provisions of the Treaty in some instances are
directed towards achieving all of the objectives but in others towards
only one or two objectives.
The first of these objectives was well expressed in the message
of the President of the United States to the Senate transmitting the
12 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Under Water with U.S.S.R. and U.K., August 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433.
19731
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Limited Test Ban Treaty: "The Treaty will curb the pollution of
our atmosphere. While it does not assure the world that it will be
forever free from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout from
atmospheric tests, it will greatly reduce the number and dangers of
such tests.' '13 As will be pointed out in a subsequent section, the
Limited Test Ban Treaty accomplished this objective almost as com-
pletely as a treaty totally banning weapons tests.
In connection with the second and third objectives, the Limited
Test Ban Treaty was a step on the road towards broader objectives.
A second and broader objective was to limit the spread of nuclear
weapons to an increasing number of states. Again to quote the
President's message to the Senate, "While it [the Treaty] cannot
wholly prevent the spread of nuclear arms to nations not now pos-
sessing them, it prohibits assistance to testing in these environments
by others; it will be signed by many other potential testers; and it
is thus an important opening wedge in our effort to 'get the genie
back in the bottle'.'
The third main objective also contemplated further agreements
and further progress. This thought is expressed in the President's
letter transmitting the Treaty, as follows:
"While it will not halt the production or reduce the existing
stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is a first step toward limiting the
nuclear arms race.
"While it will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the
use of nuclear weapons, it can reduce world tensions, open a way
to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of
war."15
These three main objectives are set forth at this point for the
reason that their interrelationship is the key to most of the specific
problems discussed in this article. It should be noted that there
was a great difference of viewpoints among states on the relative
importance of the three objectives. It is safe to conclude that all
states agreed that the first objective of reducing radioactive fallout
from the atmosphere was the most important net gain from the
Treaty. However, it will be obvious that the second objective of
preventing an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear
weapons was far less important to some, if not all, of the non-
weapon states than to the nuclear powers. Indeed, a considerable
number of non-weapon states, particularly those with potential of
13 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 3.
14 Id. at 3.
16 Id. at 3.
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developing nuclear weapons, were willing to accept the Treaty large-
ly because of the third objective. They hoped that the Treaty would
lead rapidly to further agreements limiting the nuclear weapons
race, perhaps reducing armaments and certainly lessening the dan-
gers of worldwide holocaust.
Indeed the draft resolution approved by the General Assembly
of November 27, 1963 by 104 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions, in ad-
dition to calling on states to ratify the Treaty requested "a confer-
ence of the Eighteen Nations Committee on its own to continue
with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve its objectives set
forth in the Preamble of the Treaty" which included a complete
ban of nuclear weapons testing and also General and Complete Dis-
armament. 6 This general theme, that the prime importance of the
Treaty is to act as an interim measure leading towards drastic arms
limitations and a safer world, constantly recurs in the analysis of
specific Treaty problems.
The letter of the President to the Senate spells out eight addi-
tional objectives of the Treaty, all of which might be categorized
roughly as negative objectives to dispel any thought that the Treaty,
except for its specific provisions, might limit U.S. initiatives and
policies. For example, it would not "alter the status of unrecog-
nized regimes," it would not "halt American nuclear progress," it
does not "diminish the need for continued Western and American
military strength."17 President Kennedy apparently felt that such an
approach was desirable and even necessary to assure Senate ratifi-
cation. It does, however, graphically illustrate the differences in
viewpoint concerning the Treaty between the nuclear haves, who
feared undue limits upon testing, and the nuclear have-nots, who
would support maximum limitations on the nuclear powers.
I. PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Article I(1) (a) and (b) of the Treaty, specifying the nuclear
explosions which are prohibited, has produced most of the interpre-
tive discussion of treaty provisions. Some five important questions
have arisen: two during the negotiation of the text; two during the
hearings leading to the ratification of the treaty by the U.S. Senate;
and the fifth after the Treaty came into effect.
The Draft Partial Test Ban Treaty which the United States and
16 G. A. Res. 1910, 18 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 73, at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/5597 (1963).
17 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 3.
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United Kingdom tabled on August 27, 1962 in ENDC in defining
prohibited explosions contained substantially the same language as
the final treaty.18 Paragraph I(a) prohibited explosions in the at-
mosphere, in outer space, or under water. The main drafting prob-
lem confronting the United States and the United Kingdom was to
work out language to define the underground explosions which
would be permitted. It would not have sufficed merely to authorize
the underground explosions or alternatively to prohibit explosions
in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and prohibit ex-
plosions in other environments. Drafting along these lines would
theoretically permit a State to detonate an explosion at a depth of
say three feet under the ground with a shovelful of loose dirt covering
the explosive device. Such an explosion might result in as much
radioactivity as an explosion in the atmosphere which was prohib-
ited. The suggested language prohibited explosions "in any other
environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present
outside the territorial limits of the State under Whose limits and
control such explosion is conducted." Under this language an un-
derground explosion which did not cause any venting at the surface
would be permitted. Also, an underground explosion which vented
would be permitted if the radioactive debris did not spread out-
side the territorial limits of the state controlling the explosion. 9
The Soviet response to the August 27, 1962 proposal did not
deal with this point, but rejected a partial test treaty since it would
permit continued weapon improvements resulting from underground
explosions. At this time the Soviet representative implied that if
the U.S. continued weapons tests underground, the Soviet Union
would continue to test in the atmosphere.2"
Apparently the Western explanations of the suggested language
satisfied the Soviet Union, which did not object to this provision
during the conference after Soviet acceptance in principle of a lim-
ited test ban treaty. This formula does in fact cause some inequal-
ity among states since obviously a given amount of radioactive de-
bris coming from an explosion in the middle of Siberia or the U.S.
would be less likely to result in the debris spreading beyond the
limits of the state than an identical explosion say in the Isthmus of
Panama. Likewise problems have actually arisen as to measure-
I8 Paragraph I(a) of the original draft read: "(a) in the atmosphere, above the
atmosphere, or in territorial or high seas." JACOBSON AND STEIN, supra note 6, at 410.
19d at 410.
20 Id. at 414.
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ments to determine whether radioactive debris has spread beyond
the territorial limits of a state, which will be considered in another
section. The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses permitted under the August 27, 1962 draft but excluded in
the final text will also be considered in another section.
II. ENCOURAGING A PROHIBITED EXPLOSION
The second paragraph of Article I imposed an obligation "to
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in,
the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion . . ." The August 27, 1962 proposal had merely
prohibited carrying out a nuclear explosion. This change took
place during the final month of negotiations leading to the agreed
text2' and occasioned considerable debate in the Hearings before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.2 2
Senator Fulbright on August 14, 1963 wrote to Secretary of State
Dean Rusk to ask whether the language of the Test Ban Treaty
would prevent the U.S. from transmitting nuclear data to another
power. On August 17, 1963 the Secretary of State replied as fol-
lows:
In the view of the executive branch, the test ban treaty would
bar a party from giving materials for use in nuclear weapons, or
information relating to their design or manufacture, to any other
state, whether or not a party, if that state was engaged in, or pro-
posed to engage in, nuclear weapon tests prohibited by the
treaty....
' As you know, [The Atomic Energy Act of 1954] permits
the President to give certain materials for use in nuclear weapons
and information relating to their design or manufacture to another
nation if he determines that 'such nation has made substantial
progress in the development of atomic weapons' and if an agree-
ment providing for such transfer has been before the Congress
without objection for 60 days. . . . If a nation as to which the
President could make the necessary determinations were to engage
in or propose to engage in nuclear weapons tests in the prohibited
environments, the authority granted by these sections of the act
would be limited by the treaty, for, as has been stated above, the
transfer of such information or materials to a country in these cir-
cumstances would violate article I, paragraph 2.23
The U.S. has on several occasions implemented this policy.
21 Id. at 457.
22 See exchange between Senator Cannon and Secretary of Defense McNamara, Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 180. Exchange between
Senator Morse and Chairman Seaborg, Id. at 237-38.
23 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 977-78.
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The State Department Office of Munitions Control has denied ex-
port licenses to the French Government for essential components
in their nuclear weapons testing program. However, the French ap-
parently were able to obtain the important components from
Sweden. 4  The British Government has taken similar steps. 5  Ca-
nadian restrictions on the sale of uranium to France requiring as-
surances that the uranium would not be used in the French weapons
program resulted in considerable acrimony between the two coun-
tries and a debate in the Canadian Parliament.26 The Soviet Union
has more than ample authority to impose similar restrictions, but
its performance has not been ascertained.27
III. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the discussions in the Senate Committees dealing with the
ratification of the Treaty, a number of critics of the Treaty, includ-
ing former President Eisenhower, expressed fears that the Treaty
would limit the U.S. in its right to use nuclear weapons in case of
attack or armed conflict or to come to the assistance of its allies if
they should be attacked. These fears stemmed from the language
of Article I(1) under which the Parties to the Treaty undertook to
prohibit not only "any nuclear weapon test explosion," but also
"any other nuclear explosion."
The Report of the Secretary of State to the President contained
the specific statement: "The Article does not prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the
right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations.'"'2 Despite a similar opinion from the Secretary
of Defense,2" the questions continued to be raised in the hearings.
At the request of Senator Goldwater the Secretary of State con-
sulted the Legal Adviser. The conclusion of an opinion dated
August 14, 1963 was as follows:
24 Sulzberger, Foreign Affairs: When the Atom Splits Friends, N.Y. Times, July 2,
1965, at 28, col. 3 (late city ed.).
25 Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University,
4 Alternative Methods for Dealing with Breaches of Arms Control Agreements 384
(unpublished, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ACDA TR/107].
261d. at 389-395.
2Tid. at 385-389.
28 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 5.
29Id. at 176.
[Vol. 5: 125
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
"The question has been raised whether the words 'or any other
nuclear explosion' impose any limitation on the use of nuclear
weapons by parties in war.
"The answer is no."30
The Legal Adviser at some length discussed the background
leading to the use of this language and pointed out
"This Treaty does not affect the use of nuclear weapons in war.
It has to do with nuclear weapon testing in time of peace."
This understanding of the import of the Treaty is not confined
to United States officials alone. For example, United Nations Sec-
retary-General U Thant, appearing in Moscow at the Treaty sign-
ing, listed a number of "other equally important measures aimed
at the relaxation of tension." Among these he included the follow-
ing:
"I would also hope that the proposal, initiated in the fall of
1961, for convening a special conference for signing the conven-
tion on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons for war purposes, will now receive wider support."
It would obviously be unnecessary to hold such a conference if
the test ban treaty itself outlawed the use of such weapons in war.8'
The meaning of the Treaty language and the reason for its use
is well expressed by the Honorable Authur Dean, the U.S. negotia-
tor.
The confusion appears to have arisen from a change in wording
which had taken place during the Moscow negotiations in July
1963. In the draft treaty of August 1962, testing for weapons and
testing for peaceful purposes had been separated into two articles.
It therefore made complete sense for its Article I to refer only "to
nuclear weapon test explosion." However, when the treaty draft
was being discussed at Moscow and it became clear that the Rus-
sians would not accept the second article dealing with peaceful ex-
plosions, we had to make an adjustment in the wording of the new
Article I. As the Legal Adviser to the State Department pointed
out, we could no longer accept an Article I which referred only
to nuclear weapon test explosions, because such wording might
make it possible for a nation to claim the right to conduct nuclear
explosions in the prohibited environments on the basis that it was
not a test of a weapon or that it was for peaceful purposes. There-
fore we had inserted in Article I, after the words "nuclear weapon
test explosion," the words "and other nuclear explosion." The
new phrase was intended to plug a loophole, not to inhibit the
freedom of choice of weapons by a nation faced with a threat to
its national security. To cite an authority on treaty interpretation,
"The function of the words of a treaty is to mirror [the] design"
of its framers. This was our design.3 2
ao Id. at 76.
31 Id. at 78.
3 2 A. DEAN, TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT 100-1 (1966).
19731
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
IV. UNDERWATER TESTS
The Treaty bans nuclear explosions "at any place under its juris-
diction or control: (a) ...underwater including territorial waters
or high seas." The Legal Adviser of the State Department in the
opinion previously cited interprets this language as follows:
"(a) * * * or underwater, including territorial waters or high
seas;
The question has been raised whether all bodies of water, in-
cluding inland waters, are within the scope of the italicized clause.
The answer is, yes.
If a nuclear test or explosion is "underwater," it is prohibited
by the Treaty.
The phrase "including territorial waters or high seas" is illus-
trative, and not limiting. It was inserted in the Treaty to remove
any question that tests on the high seas were prohibited, and that
a party conducting such tests would be considered to have at least
temporary control of the area in which the test is conducted. With-
out this phrase, it might have been contended that tests on the high
seas were not under the "jurisdiction or control" of a party within
the meaning of Article I, and thus were not prohibited.
The present Treaty differs from the August 27, 1962, draft
treaty tabled in Geneva by the United States and United Kingdom
delegations. That treaty banned, in addition to tests in the atmos-
phere or outer space, tests "in territorial or high seas." Underwater
tests in inland waters were not prohibited by this language. The
change made by the present treaty makes clear that tests in inland
water are prohibited. 3
This interpretation is confirmed by writers on International Law 34
who state categorically that an underwater test is above ground and
not underground. Despite the clear intent of the Treaty its op-
ponents during the sessions of the Senate Subcommittees dealing
with the nuclear test ban proposals, found in this language a de-
vious Soviet plot to place the U.S. at a strategic disadvantage. The
most forceful presentation of this view was in the testimony of
Admiral Arleigh Burke on August 27, 1963. Admiral Burke
stated "The treaty, while applicable to nuclear explosions 'under-
water, including territorial waters or high seas' does not make spe-
cific mention of 'internal waters.' The explanation of what that
may come to mean is complex and hard to follow, but it is for
these very reasons that the point needs to be thoroughly analyzed
for some day it will most likely be used to our disadvantage. ' 35
33 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 61-2.
34 Schwelb, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law, 58 AM. J. INT'L
L. 642, 647-8 (1964); E. STEIN, 1 IMPACT OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 325
(1971) [hereinafter cited as STEIN].
35 Hearings on Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and
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This conclusion totally disregards the obvious explanation of the
language set forth in the opinion of the Legal Advisor of the State
Department quoted above. Admiral Burke then proceeds with his
own explanation: "First, underwater testing per se is. not illicit;
such tests would be possible for all parties under this treaty." He
reaches the conclusion that such explosions are not illicit despite
the express language of Article 1(a) banning underwater explo-
sions. He then assumes that the phrase "including territorial wa-
ters or high seas" has the effect of excluding other underwater
areas-territorial seas or inland seas. He then suggests that the
Soviet Union has territorial seas surrounding it such as the Sea of
Okhotsk, or the Kara Sea, where it could make tests which could
not be detected by the U.S. On the other hand, the largest similar
body of water adjoining the U.S., Chesapeake Bay, is too small to
permit undetected tests. Therefore, Admiral Burke finds a situa-
tion deliberately planned to the disadvantage of the United States.86
It is suggested that Admiral Burke's conclusion is farfetched.
As pointed out, nothing in the Treaty language confines the pro-
hibition on underwater testing to tests under territorial waters or
the high seas. If the Soviet Union conducted such tests and they
were detected by the U.S., the U.S. would with overwhelming
World support proclaim that this was a breach of the Treaty. The
breach would justify immediate abrogation of the Treaty by the
U.S. In view of the United States' position that it must be pre-
pared to resume testing in case of violations, it is difficult to see how
such a situation would seriously damage the U.S. Politically, how-
ever, it seems highly unlikely that regardless of the fact that nu-
clear tests are becoming progressively cleaner, any state would be
willing to conduct such tests either in its inland waters, its terri-
torial waters, or its territorial seas. The Soviet Union already has
a huge pollution problem in Lake Baikal.
The remaining argument of Admiral Burke that such under-
water tests might not be detected by the U.S. also seems farfetched.
The shift from an unlimited test ban to a limited test ban arose
because the United States and the United Kingdom contended that
without on-site inspection they might not be able to detect some
underground tests. The entire basis for the Limited Test Ban
Treaty was that the U.S. and U.K. could detect tests in any other
Related Matters Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 925-6 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Preparedness Subcommittee Hearings].
36 Id. at 922.
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environment, including underwater tests. We are aware of no
serious contentions that this was an erroneous judgment.
It should be noted that in the ten years that have followed the
Treaty none of these interpretations of the language of Article I
set forth above as to prohibited or permitted explosions have caused
problems. No state adhering to the Treaty has made nuclear tests
underwater or in the atmosphere. No state has contended that
the nuclear test ban in any way restricts the use of nuclear weapons
in war and indeed, negotiations have continued without much suc-
cess during the entire ten year period in the direction of limiting the
wartime use of nuclear weapons. On the problem of what consti-
tutes encouragement of a state to carry out a nuclear test, the gov-
ernments of the U.S., U.K. and Canada have taken administrative
decisions which seem to conform to the intent of the Treaty. The
sole section of Article I which has required interpretation is the
definition of explosions causing radioactive debris to be present out-
side the territorial limits of the state controlling an explosion.
V. RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS
During the Senate Hearings prior to the ratification of the Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, a number of witnesses pointed out a pos-
sible ambiguity in defining an explosion which "causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. '' I These
ambiguities arise from the technical problem of measuring radioac-
tive debris and determining its origin. The atmosphere at all times
contains a certain amount of radioactivity which may increase with-
out any known cause. Even a fairly substantial increase in radioac-
tivity at a measuring station on the boundary of a country, coupled
with an appropriate time relationship between the increase and an
underground nuclear explosion which vented, would not necessarily
prove the causal relationship between the venting and the increase
of radioactivity. The negotiators of the Treaty apparently did not
worry greatly over this problem since measuring techniques would
be adequate to establish the causal relationship between a venting
explosion and measurable exposures to persons, occurring shortly
after the explosion. This has been the one problem, however,
where the actual practices of the Soviet Union and the United States
required Treaty interpretation.
37 See generally Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 2-4.
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On March 13, 1964, the U.S. conducted an underground test
which, notwithstanding precautions, vented. The radioactive de-
bris was traced throughout the southwestern part of the United
States. No other country reported detecting it within its bound-
aries. However, on March 17, 1964, Isvestia wrote an article on
these tests entitled "Dangerous Experiments" pointing out that if
the debris had spread, it would be a direct violation of the Treaty.
The Soviet Union made no official request for information on the
test.38
On January 15, 1965, a Soviet underground nuclear test in the
Semipalitinsk region was held. The detection system disclosed a
"certain amount of venting . . .and that the radioactivity measured
to date will not produce measurable exposures to persons." The
Secretary of State, on January 19th, asked the Soviet Ambassador
for full details concerning the explosion and an explanation of how
the venting took place. The State Department Press Officer was
quoted as saying that in case of a treaty provision of this character
"it is necessary to work out a pragmatic meaning and application of
the language in the light of actual experience." An Associated
Press statement reported that the Japanese weather bureau had de-
tected more radioactivity from this test venting than it had detected
from the Chinese atmosphere explosion the previous October. On
January 25th, the Secretary of State met with the Soviet Ambassa-
dor who stated that the amount of radioactive debris was "so in-
significant that the Soviet Government excludes the possibility of a
violation of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." Ambassador
William Foster, the Director of the United States Arms Control
Disarmament Agency, reported to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the event may have constituted "a technical viola-
tion" of the Treaty.89
On January 17, 1966, a U.S. B-52 Bomber carrying nuclear
weapons crashed over the Spanish coast. The Soviet Union in an
aide memoir on February 17, 1966 claimed that "the detonator of
at least one of these bombs exploded and radioactive substances
were released." The aide memoir went on to claim a violation of
the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This was a pure propaganda ploy.
According to Ambassador Foster "no nuclear explosion occurred
because the controls designed to prevent such explosion by accident
384 ACDA TR/107, supra note 25, at 356.
39ld. at 356-358.
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performed as they were intended to perform."4  The American
Government rejected the Soviet allegation in an aide memoir of
February 25, 1966.
On September 12, 1966, the U.S. conducted an underground nu-
clear test in Nevada. A very small amount of radioactivity leaked
into the atmosphere but according to the State Department no radio-
active debris was carried outside the U.S. The Soviet Ambassador,
on October 10th, inquired about the radioactivity in the air from this
underground test.4
On October 27, 1966, the Soviet Government conducted on the
Arctic Island of Novaya Zemlya an underground test explosion
which had a force of about one megaton. The Soviet Ambassador
was called to the State Department for information concerning this
test. The New York Times of November 9 quoted the trade maga-
zine AVIATION WEEK in saying that considerable venting of nu-
clear debris had been detected by the U.S. in the Far East and in
Europe. This Soviet explosion apparently took place within fif-
teen minutes after a Chinese nuclear explosion in the atmosphere.
There is considerable question whether it would have been possible
to distinguish between the radioactive materials from the two dif-
ferent tests.4"
It seems probable that other ventings may have occurred more
recently in connection with Soviet and U.S. underground explosions.
However, there have been no diplomatic repercussions. It is ap-
parent that the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to
disregard "the technical violations" particularly since both powers
may have been guilty of such violations. No other state has used
these technical violations as a pretext for withdrawing from the
Treaty pursuant to Article IV or for any contention that it is re-
leased from the Treaty by reason of violations of other parties. Nor
has any party invoked any of the possible International Law pro-
cedures available in the event of breaches of treaties.
VI. RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL
Article IV provides "Each party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it de-
cides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
Treaty have jeojardized the supreme interests of its country. It
401d. at 358.
4 1 Id. at 364.
42 Id. at 364.
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shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the
Treaty three months in advance." The critics of the Treaty in the
United States Senate immediately pointed out that this provision
has the effect of reducing the commitments of the parties almost to
zero since, for any excuse which a state deemed sufficient, it would
be able to withdraw from the Treaty after ninety days and relieve
itself of the commitment. This was a major reason for the U.S.
Government at the time of submission to the Senate insisting that
it must maintain a posture of nuclear strength and be ready to re-
sume atmospheric testing if the Soviet Union withdrew from its
Treaty obligations.
The history of this clause sheds considerable light on the cir-
cumstances surrounding the final successful negotiations leading to
the Treaty.43 The original draft partial test ban treaty submitted
by the Western powers on August 27, 1962, and rejected by the
Soviet Union, provided a complicated procedure for withdrawal
which would have taken up to 120 days and would have involved
a conference of all signatory states. Furthermore, the grounds for
withdrawal were considerably more limited than in the final ver-
sion."
Foreign Minister Gromyko originally had argued that there was
no need for a withdrawal clause since the right to withdraw was
an inherent right of sovereignty.45 This Soviet position has no sup-
port in International Law even from Soviet authorities. Beginning
in the Nineteen Twenties, the Soviet jurists began to stress inter-
national treaties as the prime source of International Law; and that
States are "obliged to perform international treaties in good faith
which are concluded on the basis of equality and do not contradict
prevailing International Law.''46 This Soviet position excused the
Soviet repudiation of the treaties of the Czarist regime and at the
same time promised future good conduct. Gromyko's remark was
apparently a reversion to the earlier Communist position that any
State was free at any time to renounce any Treaty. It may quite
possibly have arisen from the desire of the Soviet delegates on the
43 JACOBSON AND STEIN, supra note 8, at 455-458.
44Text in: The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Report of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, U. S. Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rep. No. 3, Sept. 3, 1963, Appendix
11, at 29.
5 (Testimony of Dean Rusk) Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, s.pra
note 4, at 50.
464 ACDA TR/107, supra note 25, at 93.
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question of testing to have freedom as complete as China, which
was obviously not going to sign the Treaty.47
Obviously, the United States and other Western powers could
not subscribe to such a Soviet position which would call in question
the entire range of Treaty obligations. Furthermore, if the Treaty
were silent on the right of withdrawal, past experience on the mat-
ter of testing had made it clear that the obligations of the Soviet
Union and the United States would not in fact be equal. The United
States would feel itself bound not to test without going through
some lengthy procedures to justify the circumstances requiring it to
resume tests. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, in the recent
past, had repudiated the moratorium on tests merely by conducting
a nuclear test with a simultaneous public announcement of the test.
The withdrawal language was submitted at the request of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who insisted that it was absolutely essential
from the standpoint of American military security.48 During the
Moscow discussions Ambassador Harriman told Gromyko that with-
out a withdrawal clause there could be no treaty.4"
The exact stipulation is so loose that it has been likened to "a
marriage contract with a protocol for divorce."5  Stein concludes
that in light of the legislative history the withdrawal clause was
_a part of a hasty political compromise rather than a reflection of
a general principle of Treaty Law." It is ironical that some of the
strongest opponents of the Treaty opposed U.S. ratification partly
on the ground that the provision reduced the Treaty commitments
almost to zero, and, therefore, adversely affected American secu-
rity.51
This type of provision turned out to be more important to the
non-nuclear weapon states than to the great powers. The accept-
ance by the non-weapon states of the unequal situation imposed by
the Non-Proliferation Treaty depended upon progress towards nu-
clear disarmament. In the absence of such progress, the non-weapon
states through their right of withdrawal preserved their future
options.
Regardless of hastily drafted and broad language susceptible to
47 JACOBSON AND STEIN, supra note 6, at 457.
48 Preparedness Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 35, at 558.
49 4 ACDA TR/107, supra note 25, at 332.
50 T. SORENSON, KENNEDY 736 (1965).
51 (e.g., testimony of Strausz-Hupe) Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings,
supra note 4, at 511.
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varying interpretations, the same general formula has been followed
in the Outer Space Treaty permitting a withdrawal on one year's
notice,52 the Seabed Treaty,53 the Non-Proliferation Treaty' and
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin Amer-
ica.55 Despite international crises no state has) yet taken advantage
of its right of withdrawal. It is suggested that this formula, how-
ever ambiguous and however defective in terms of fundamental
principles of International Law, has provided a realistic compromise
which gives states great flexibility in meeting emergencies such as
the outbreak of war among possible minor nuclear powers or revolu-
tionary new technological developments. At the same time the
states are not totally free to repudiate their obligations without in-
curring stigma.
VII. NON-ADHERING STATES
Until this point, the discussion has been addressed primarily to
the question: What is the meaning of the Treaty? The remaining
issues are directed primarily to a different question: -- -re does
the Treaty lead? For the non-weapons states, the latter question
was frequently the more important question.
Article III, paragraph 3 of the Treaty provided that it "shall en-
ter into force after its ratification by all of the Original Parties and
the deposit of their instruments of ratification." The Original Par-
ties were the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union. Thus theoretically the Treaty could go into effect without
any of the non-weapon states and without China and France adher-
ing to it. How significant would the Treaty be with few states ad-
hering?
A Treaty adhered to solely by the "Original Parties" would go
a long way towards meeting one of its three prime objectives, the
curbing of the pollution of the atmosphere at least and until the
number of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere by other states re-
sulted in substantial fallout. Between the effective date of the
52 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
53 Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
54 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2373 (XXII), Annex U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1.
55 Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137.
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Treaty and 1972, France detonated 26 atmospheric explosions and
nine underground explosions, China has had 13 atmospheric and
one underground explosion. The total fallout from these explo-
sions has been relatively insignificant and has not prevented steady
lowering of atmospheric levels of radioactivity. 6
However, a second main objective of the Treaty - that of pre-
venting the spread of nuclear arms to nations not possessing them,
would be thwarted if any substantial number of states with nuclear
capabilities failed to ratify the Treaty and went forward despite the
Treaty to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. In fact, the vast
majority of states accepted the Treaty. Only France, which had al-
ready made nuclear tests, and China, which was about to start such
tests, continued their testing programs.
The emergence of five nuclear powers rather than three of
course enhances the possibility of irresponsible resort to nuclear
weapons. However, France at all times, and China certainly within
the last year, have shown a sense of political responsibility indicat-
ing that they may be as cautious in brandishing nuclear weapons as
the three powers that developed them at an earlier time.
It must be recognized that neither France nor China have de-
veloped weapons systems which could pose a major threat to the
U.S.S.R. or to the U.S. It is unlikely that France will ever develop a
system of such magnitude and the emergence of a major Chinese
threat seems some time off.57 Therefore, for the present, the fail-
ure of China and France to adhere to the Treaty and their continu-
ing atmospheric tests have not significantly impaired the effective-
ness of the Limited Test Ban. A recent study concluded that only
seven non-nuclear weapons countries have industrial economies ca-
pable of supporting the manufacture of a sizeable number of reason-
ably sophisticated nuclear weapons and of systems for their delivery
within five to ten years. "8 Six of the seven, Australia, Italy, Canada,
Japan, Sweden and West Germany adhered to the Test Ban Treaty;
the seventh, India, failed to adhere but has not made any weapons
tests. India, as well as Pakistan, Israel and some of the Arab States
56 See Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 32 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Nonproliferation Treaty Hearings]; STEIN, supra note 34, at 327-
328.
5T H. KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE 241 (1961).
58 B. BOSKEY AND M. WILLRICH, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPEcTS FOR
CONTROL 29 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION); see also, A.
BUCHAN, A WORLD OF NUCLEAR POWERS? 5 (1966); and M. WILLRICH, GLOBAL
POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 85 (1971).
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have to a certain extent used their failure to adhere as a political
weapon. Regardless of the wisdom or effectiveness of such a course,
their failure to adhere to the Test Ban Treaty so far has not ma-
terially affected the Treaty objective of limiting the spread of nuclear
weapons systems, nor has it had any apparent effect on progress to-
wards other agreements in the atomic energy field.
VIII. TOWARD AN UNLIMITED TEST BAN
The Treaty in its Preamble specifically stated the international
objective of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time" and of continuing "negotiations to
this end ... to put an end to the contamination of man's environ-
ment by radioactive systems." This expectation that the next step
towards limiting nuclear weapons and towards a safer world would
be an unlimited test ban treaty, failed to materialize for a number
of reasons.
First, the original draft for a Limited Test Ban Treaty submitted
by the U.S. and U.K. contained an exception to authorize nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes. Such an exception, using the code
designation adopted by the U.S. will be described as the "plowshare"
exception. The Soviet Union rejected this approach on the osten-
sive ground that the plowshare exception could be used to evade
the weapons test ban. The original initiative of the U.S. and U.K.
to authorize nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes had reflected
long range research programs already undertaken by both the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. to determine the practical feasibility "of nuclear
explosives ...in projects with economic objectives." Such projects
included the employment of nuclear explosives "to assist in the re-
covery of natural resources, to create cavities for the storage of
natural gas, to aid in water resources development, to excavate chan-
nels and harbors, to change the course of rivers, to construct dams,
to be a radiation source in scientific experiments.' '9
The Limited Test Ban Treaty as it emerged did not completely
prevent such explosions provided that they did not cause radioac-
tive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control the explosions were conducted.
In general, the programs to assist in the recovery of natural resources
and to create cavities for the storage of natural gas would not vent
and therefore could be conducted after the Treaty became effective.
59 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 58, at 87.
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On the other hand, the excavation of channels and harbors using
nuclear weapons would be forbidden.
It seems probable that the Soviet opposition to permitting a
plowshare exception stemmed more from a realization of the com-
plex legal problems involved in its formulation than from a fear
that the exception would be used to promote weapons programs.
The vast programs of underground explosions undertaken since the
Treaty by both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to develop their weapons
systems indicate small concern for the treaty objective of limiting
the weapons program. The legal problems would have been suffi-
ciently complex as to stall adoption, signature and ratification of
the Limited Test Ban Treaty for a long time. The same complexi-
ties are one reason for the lack of progress toward an unlimited test
ban treaty, especially since the peaceful applications of nuclear ex-
plosions most likely to become economically feasible in a five or ten
year period were those which would not result in venting and could
therefore be carried on under the existing treaty. They could not
however be conducted under an unlimited test ban without a plow-
share exception.
A second and even more important reason for not moving rap-
idly to agreement on an unlimited test ban can be inferred from the
tremendous programs of underground weapons tests undertaken by
both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which make it clear that both coun-
tries had the capability and the desire to improve their weapons sys-
tems through underground testing. It is only in the past year after
the discharge by the U.S. of the huge Amchitka explosion which
followed a Soviet underground explosion of greater magnitude, that
both countries have slowed down in their underground tests and
have given some indications that the objectives of the underground
weapons tests may at long last have been achieved.
A third factor which steered the Arms Control negotiations away
from the objective of an unlimited test ban was the realization that
the time had passed when an unlimited test ban would serve much
of a purpose in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons sys-
tems. In 1963 four States had weapons systems and China was on
the verge of its first nuclear explosion. The fact that practically all
tests had resulted in detonations with almost no "duds" made it
probable that non-weapons states could acquire weapons capabilities
even without testing.
At the same time, by 1963 the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were acute-
ly aware of the implications of the technological breakthrough which
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had made nuclear power economically feasible. The danger is
graphically described as follows:
The stockpiles of plutonium will soon dwarf the amounts of
fissionable materials in the nuclear weapons stockpiles of all nu-
clear weapons States. Moreover, tens of thousands of kilograms
of plutonium will be available in non-nuclear weapon States. Yet
less than ten kilograms of plutonium are required for a bomb ca-
pable of destroying a medium-sized city. The latest threat to world
security in civil nuclear power programs is already clear and will
grow to staggering dimensions.60
The emphasis in international negotiations logically shifted to
an approach to meet this menace head-on, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
IX. TOWARDS A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
Commencing in 1958 a number of resolutions passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations had suggested negotiations
which might lead to a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weap-
ons. In the General Assembly of 1962 there was considerable sup-
port for the idea that such a treaty should be given priority after an
agreement had been worked out on the cessation of nuclear weapons
tests."' The 1962 discussions of course preceded the Limited Test
Ban and assumed that the first agreement would be an unlimited
test ban. It was not however until 1965 that the General Assembly
and the United Nations specifically called upon the Eighteen Na-
tions Disarmament Commission to reconvene as soon as possible to
accord specific priority to consider a treaty to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. Beginning in 1964, the emphasis on the
next step to nuclear disarmament shifted from negotiating an un-
limited test ban to negotiating the non-proliferation treaty. On
June 23, 1964, the U.S. presented to the ENDC a proposal for a
complete "cutoff" of fissionable materials for weapons programs
indicating a major change in philosophy.62 The 1964 proposal was
resubmitted to the ENDC in the form of a draft non-proliferation
treaty on August 17, 1965. The Soviet Union made its own pro-
posal on September 24, choosing the U.N. General Assembly rather
than the ENDC as the forum for its proposal.
6 3
60M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL 30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY].
61 THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 195.
62 Document DC/209, annex 1, section J (ENDC/134), at 34.
63 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, supra note 60, at 63.
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Despite the mutual interest of the Soviet Union and the United
States in achieving such a Treaty, it took more than three years from
the original U.S. suggestion to resolve the differences between the
Soviet Union and the U.S. centering "on the defense of Western
Europe where American weapons were known to be present and in
the possession of American and other national forces, but over
which the U.S. had a unilateral right of decision as to their use, the
national forces being integrated within the NATO military com-
mand arrangements."64 The United States at this time had proposed
to its allies in Western Europe the so-called "Multilateral Nuclear
Force" (MLF) under which a NATO fleet would have custody of
nuclear weapons with the control of their use remaining in the
United States. Without going into any details or passing on the
overall merits of any such proposal, it clearly created great difficul-
ties for the Soviet Union in going forward towards a nuclear cutoff.
Since China had not yet achieved a nuclear capability the effect of a
"cutoff" plus the MLF in the Soviet eyes might be that China, a
Communist State, would be barred from developing a nuclear weap-
ons capability while West Germany would have a finger on the
nuclear trigger. To be sure, the United States went to great lengths
to show technical arrangements to prevent Germany having its finger
on the trigger. However, these technical explanations, and indeed
the entire concept of the MLF was too complex to explain in a
manner that would be convincing to world public opinion. Rapid
progress toward a non-proliferation treaty commenced in 1967 when
the U.S. virtually abandoned its advocacy of the MLF.
It is outside the purposes of this article to enter into a detailed
discussion of the negotiation or details of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty except insofar as the Treaty has affected and is likely to affect
the status of the Limited Test Ban. As pointed out, the Limited
Test Ban Treaty in general does not differentiate between weapon
states and non-weapon states. Both weapon states and non-weapon
states are prohibited from testing in the atmosphere, in outer space,
or underwater. Both weapon states and non-weapon states are per-
mitted to test nuclear devices underground. The sole factual differ-
entation between weapon and non-weapon states is that a test which
vented in the middle of Siberia might not result in radioactive debris
spreading outside the territories of the Soviet Union while a similar
test in a smaller country would probably result in such a spread of
fissionable material. On the other hand, the Non-Proliferation
64 A. MCKNIGHT, ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS 67 (1971).
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Treaty as it emerged differentiated sharply between the weapon
states which will continue to have their stockpiles of weapons and
are permitted to increase these stockpiles of weapons; and the non-
weapon states which are forbidden to acquire nuclear explosive de-
vices either through manufacture or through transfer. In the area
of testing nuclear explosives, the effect of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty is that the weapon states may continue underground nuclear
tests whether for weapons or for peaceful purposes, while such test-
ing is prohibited for non-weapon states. This unequal treatment has
resulted in loud protests by the non-weapon states particularly in
connection with the problem of future nuclear explosions with
peaceful objectives. The non-weapon states could rightly proclaim
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was creating a monopoly among
the weapon states for the development of peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions. The Limited Test Ban Treaty sought to silence
these objections by paragraphs in the Preamble affirming the prin-
ciple that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology
including those derived from the development of nuclear explosive
devices should be available for peaceful purposes to all parties to
the Treaty whether weapon or non-weapon states. Article V of
the Treaty goes on to provide machinery under which the nuclear
weapon states will make the benefit of peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions available to the non-nuclear weapon states
through the weapon states conducting explosions on behalf of the
non-weapon states.
So long as these peaceful explosions would not vent, for exam-
ple, explosions to release oil or gas, or to develop underground
storage cavities, they could be conducted by a weapon state on the
territory of and for the benefit of a non-weapon state without vio-
lating either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Limited Test Ban
Treaty. However, any peaceful explosion to dig a canal or to es-
tablish a harbor would of necessity result in fallout spreading be-
yond the boundaries of a state except if the fallout were reduced to
a point which is apparently still not technologically feasible. There-
fore the development of this type of peaceful use of nuclear explo-
sions would inevitably require either amendment to the Limited
Test Ban Treaty of perhaps an interpretation, the practical equiva-
lent of an amendment. It seems inevitable that at some future time,
international action will be required to permit peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions.
The chief factors in determining that time probably will be the
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pressure of World opinion, progress towards economically feasible
uses of nuclear explosions, and whether or not the Limited Test Ban
Treaty is converted into an unlimited ban.
In 1964 and 1965, former President Johnson succeeded in con-
vincing the World that economically feasible uses for nuclear ex-
plosions were just around the corner. At that time, the U.S. was
seeking to negotiate a treaty with Panama for a sea level canal.
When the Panamanian negotiators seemed adamant in adhering to
unreasonable positions, the President determined to explore the
possibilities of alternative routes. Since the alternatives apparently
could be justified economically only if nuclear 'explosions were used,
the President in 1965 directed a commission by December 1, 1970
to work out a plan for digging the canal with nuclear explosives and
to locate the site.65 The President made no mention of political
factors such as the probability that such nuclear explosions would
be a violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This incident, which
can be best characterized as foreign policy by trauma, created un-
justified expectations among the non-weapon states of immediate
benefits which in fact were years distant. With considerable diffi-
culty the nuclear weapon states were able to close the 'Pandora's
Box' which had been opened by the Panama episode and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty was signed and adhered to by the vast majority
of states.
A recent study of the progress of the plowshare program points
out the numerous
• . . [I]ntangible factors which dominate any analysis of the
economic utility of nuclear explosives. Any such analysis is, there-
fore, likely to reflect the perspectives of the analyst.
Statements made by persons associated with the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, its contractors, and industries involved in non-
military applications of nuclear explosives (and their equivalents
in other nations) tend to be sanguine about the prospects. Persons
whose dominant interest is arms control and the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons tend to give more emphasis to the factors in-
dicating that the economic utility will not be substantial. 6
The Senate Hearings on the Non-Proliferation Treaty6 tended
to establish that excavation projects using nuclear explosives might
be feasible between 1974 and 1979, and peaceful explosions which
did not vent would probably be feasible at an earlier date. Thus
65 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 58 at 99 (chapter by D. Brooks and H.
Myers).
66 ld. at 100.
67 Nonproliferation Treaty Hearings, supra note 56, at 105, 116, 119.
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the Limited Test Ban Treaty could be ratified without a plowshare
exception, and amendment of the Treaty could be postponed until,
say, 1975. If, however, the Limited Test Ban became unlimited,
a plowshare exception would be required immediately.
Nevertheless some knowledgeable proponents of an immediate
unlimited test ban, realizing the difficulty of international negotia-
tion of a plowshare exception, have continued to urge an unlimited
test ban without a plowshare exception, justifying this course by
downgrading the importance and imminence of the "plowshare"
program.68
It is clear that in the past three years, considerable advances have
taken place toward economically feasible nuclear explosions, both
underground explosions and cratering explosions. As to the latter,
it is believed that devices have been perfected to minimize fallout.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union is apparently far advanced in its
program to dig a canal reversing the flow of one of the Siberian
rivers from the Arctic Ocean to the Caspian Sea. The time is ripe
for a "plowshare exception."
The obvious procedure would be amendment of the Limited
Test Ban Treaty to permit peaceful explosions and development of
the international agreements including safeguards systems, described
in Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The IAEA and U.S.
Government have already conducted extensive studies concerning
the agreements which may be required."9
While an amendment to the Limited Test Ban Treaty to author-
ize specifically the plowshare exception is obviously the clearest
course of action, it is possible to contend that the Non-Proliferation
Treaty has already amended the Limited Test Ban Treaty to pro-
duce the same results. The Preamble of the Treaty affirms "the
principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear tech-
nology including any technological by-products which may be de-
rived by nuclear weapon states from the development of nuclear
explosive devices shall be available for peaceful purposes to all
parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weap-
on States."
It might be argued that upon completion of the agreements to
share the benefits of peaceful explosion and establishment of an
international body to deal with the problems, presumably the IAEA
itself, all as provided in Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
68 H. J. Scoville, After SALT, a Total Test Ban, Washington Post, February 9, 1973.
609 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 58, at 103-115.
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peaceful explosions could proceed without a formal amendment of
the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
The line of reasoning might be somewhat as follows:
1. Under Article II, 2, the Limited Test Ban can be amended
by the majority of votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including
the Original Parties (United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R.).
2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been ratified by more
states than the minimum number required to amend the Limited
Test Ban Treaty.
3. The vote in the IAEA approving any plowshare agreements
negotiated under Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and set-
ting up IAEA as the agency responsible for carrying out the Agree-
ments would likewise include more than the number of states re-
quired to amend the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
4. Thus, any action approved by a sufficient majority of either
of these groups would be tantamount to an amendment of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty.
5. Therefore, it might be possible to dispense with a formal
amendment of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
This line of reasoning would receive some support from exam-
ples cited by Hackworth of termination of a prior treaty by impli-
cation because of a subsequent inconsistent treaty obligation."' The
line of reasoning might conceivably come within one interpretation
of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.71
A third theory to justify such a result would be to interpret the
term, radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the State
controlling the explosion, to refer only to radioactive debris in such
quantities as to constitute a health hazard. 72
Use of any of these lines of reasoning, however, could create
the suspicion that the proponents were first determining the results
which they wished to achieve and then finding the legal formula to
justify the result; a situation not unknown in either domestic or in-
ternational law.
X. ESTIMATE
The Limited Test Ban Treaty has achieved some but not all of
the objectives of a complete test ban. Despite continued atmospher-
70 G. HACKWORTH, 5 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 306 (1943).
71 Id. at 349, 354.
72 Chayes, An Inquiry into the Working of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARV.
L. R. 905, 938. Professor Chayes points out (at 919-20) that delays in treaty making
might make such an interpretation essential.
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ic testing by China and France, the Treaty has curbed the pollution
of the atmosphere. Despite the non-adherence by a number of
states with potential of developing nuclear weapons systems, only
China, which was on the verge of testing its first nuclear weapon
at the time of the Treaty, has been added to the nuclear weapon
states. Thus the Treaty may have at least delayed the spread of
nuclear arms to states not possessing them. The Treaty was never
intended to halt the production or reduce the existing stockpile of
weapons and, unfortunately, it apparently has not materially curbed
the Soviet Union or the United States in expanding and improving
their nuclear capabilities. Apparently both the U.S. and Soviet
Union in 1963 had been determined to continue underground weap-
ons testing after the Treaty.73 The U.S. had conducted 246 under-
ground tests since the Treaty and the Soviet Union had presumably
conducted 76, as of January 1973.
In sending this Treaty to the Senate, President Kennedy had ex-
pressed the hope that it might "reduce world tensions, open the way
to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of war.
' 74
President Kennedy's hopes have been amply realized and this may
be the chief achievement of the Treaty. The Treaty showed that
it was possible to break the cause of the stalemate which ever since
the Second World War had prevented agreements on arms control
measures; i.e., the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept any
substantial on-site inspection behind the Iron Curtain to verify that
the Soviet Union was observing its commitments. The Treaty served
to focus arms control measures on arms limitations which did not
require on-site inspection in order to give reasonable assurance that
they were being observed.
The Treaty mechanism of permitting a party to withdraw on 90
days notice if it decided that "extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interest
of its country" was an essential ingredient in selling the treaty for-
mula both to the weapons and the non-weapons states. It provided
an easy "out" if any of the nuclear weapons states failed to live up
to the spirit of the Treaty. At the same time the provision, contrary
to prophets of doom at the time of its submission and ratification,
has not affected the durability of the Treaty. No state has utilized
its right to withdraw.
Perhaps the prime reason for the durability of the Treaty is that
73 Id. at 931.
74 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 4, at 2-4.
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the nuclear powers have in fact gone forward towards further agree-
ments to reduce world tensions and ease the threat of war. In the
arms control field most of these agreements were patterned on the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: - the Outer Space Treaty, the
Seabed Treaty, the extremely significant Non-Proliferation Treaty
and even the initial SALT agreements. They all contained com-
mitments not requiring on-site inspection.
It may be that this momentum towards reduction of international
tensions has played some role in the successful efforts toward de-
tente with the Soviet Union and with China. This underlines that
the chief importance of the Limited Test Ban Treaty rests not in
its commitments and obligations but as a significant event in the
international political history of the past decade.
